INTRODUCTION
The financial literature which examines the impact of capital expenditure news on share prices has traditionally focused on two main topics: (i) the manner in which stock markets react to investment announcements and (ii) the different features of both the firm and its investment opportunities which influence the market response. The former is mainly devoted to measuring excess market returns surrounding the announcement of new capital expenditures by a firm. 1 The latter describes the relationships observed between capital spending and some variables such as the quality of investment opportunities in the firm, its level of cash flow, or the level of insider ownership. The scenarios advanced by studies of investment announcements are thus associated with the efficient market hypothesis, on one hand, and the free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) or the asymmetric information approach of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) , on the other hand. Recent research on corporate investment therefore has adopted a multidisciplinary approach and obtained mixed results.
Current research on the market reaction to capital expenditure announcements has been described in two recent papers: Woolridge (1988) , whose first aim was to classify the different kinds of investment expenditures and the market response to each type, and Burton et al. (1999) . Both papers set up at least three different scenarios to classify investment announcements according to the sign and magnitude of the expected reaction of market prices: (i) the neo-classical approach, which expects a rise in prices equal to the prospective net benefit for the shareholders; (ii) the rational expectations market approach, for which any potential impact of investment announcements has already been impounded in share prices; and (iii) the myopic approach, which suggests that any large investment expense is followed by a downward adjustment in market prices due to the over-optimistic position of the managers.
Because of the different expectations, it is difficult to determine what the market response to investment announcements should be.
2 A priori, share prices might be expected to vary according to the direction of the change in the capital expenditure: that is, announcements on increases in capital expenditure (ICE) might be expected to represent good news, whilst decreases in capital expenditure (DCE) might be interpreted as bad news. 3 The principal studies on DCE announcements are mainly dedicated to measuring the share price performance after the publication of the news. For example, Kalra et al. (1994) analyse the price reaction to plant-closing announcements finding that, on average, plant-closing firms have below average returns in the short term, but above-average returns some years after the closure date. They also consider other features such as the net present value (NPV) of the project or the reasons for the closure (i.e., the management's failure to achieve their objectives) in their analysis. In fact, several papers which analyse the effects of voluntary sell-offs also identify the presence of positive abnormal returns after the announcement (Afshar et al., 1992 , for UK markets, or Denning and Shatri, 1990 , for the US). Corhay and Tourani Rad (1996) also show that positive abnormal returns are earned on the day of the divestiture announcement and the day before, depending on which measures of returns are employed. 4 In contrast to their DCE counterparts, the reaction to ICE announcements does vary dramatically from one study to another. For example, Woolridge (1988) finds no significant differences among the different kinds of capital expenses that a firm may undertake. 5 However, McConnell and Muscarella (1985) , who focus on industrial and public utility firms, Born and Ryan (2000) , who analyse the gas-and-oil industry, Burton et al. (1999) , who study all industry groups, and Chan et al. (1990) , who distinguish between high versus low-technology industries, all find important differences between groups. There also exists an important line of research which tries to identify the market response to R&D expenditures. 6 These studies typically find that investments in R&D are positively valued by the market, although the valuation varies according to firm size or industry.
Indeed, it is difficult to determine a priori what the market reaction will be to any corporate investment (or divestment) announcement. Chung et al. (1998) criticise the absence of any economic reasoning underlying the results presented in previous studies. We still lack a convincing explanation for why investment announcements do not have the same economic effect on market prices depending on the industry examined or the level of technology of the firm being studied. In fact, there exist several circumstances surrounding the managerial decision that could determine whether the market perceives the information as good or bad news: the q-ratio of the firm (and therefore, the quality of its investment opportunities), the existence of previous investment announcements, and the uncertainty about the realisation of the project.
As stated above, an important part of the research on corporate investment relates the market impact of an investment announcement to other corporate financial theories, namely, the free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) or the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) . It has been documented that the impact of news about capital spending on share prices varies according to the quality of the investment opportunity set of the firm, its free cash flow or the type of financing source employed. Particularly, recent studies such as Vogt (1997) , Chen and Ho (1997) or Chung et al. (1998) have obtained outstanding results in the joint analysis of capital expenditure news in association with either the investment opportunity set of the firm or the level of free cash flow.
Regarding the investment opportunity set, Chen and Ho (1997) find that Singaporean capital markets penalise those firms whose investment opportunities are of low quality, as measured by Tobin's q. Chung et al. (1998) arrive at a similar conclusion for US markets. They detect a negative abnormal performance for investment announcements in firms without valuable investment opportunities. The abnormal returns become positive either (i) when firms announce a decrease in capital spending, or (ii) when a firm's q ratio is greater than one and an increase in investment is proposed. Similar results are obtained by Szewczyk et al. (1996) and Burton et al. (1999) , although the latter measure investment opportunities using the market-to-book ratio. In general, the results suggest that investors penalise those firms that invest their funds in low quality projects; as a result, prices move downwards to reflect the lack of optimism about the firm's future prospects.
Several authors have suggested that the free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) also plays an important role in determining the market reaction to corporate investment announcements. Any cash flow that is not consumed by positive NPV investment opportunities may be wasted by managers who may finance non-valuable investment projects. Therefore, firms having low (high) free cash flow levels are expected to experience positive (negative) abnormal returns after investment announcements. This hypothesis is consistent with Vogt's (1997) results. However, Chen and Ho's (1997) findings do not support the free cash flow theory when assessing the value of corporate investments on product strategies.
In this study, we try to provide evidence regarding the value effects of investment announcements in European capital markets, where little evidence is available. We first examine the effects on share prices of a sample composed of both ICE and DCE announcements; subsequently we disaggregate the sample into two sub-samples composed of investments and divestments, respectively. We also test both the free cash flow and the pecking order hypotheses. A number of insights emerge from this study. First, an analysis of abnormal returns around the announcement date raises questions about the rational expectations approach. Investors are able to anticipate the information contained in investment announcements five days before the announcement. Second, event-study methodology is complemented by constructing a regression model which sheds light on the valuation effects of (i) the asymmetric distribution of information, (ii) the unexpected character of the announcement, and (iii) some firm characteristics, such as the level of free cash flow and the scale of any investment opportunities. The interaction between these variables seems to be concealing a post-event market reaction to the investment announcements, which comes to light for the disaggregated sample.
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 describes the sample and the methodological design; it also focuses on the sensitivity of the results to changes in the return-generation model. Section 3 describes the results, distinguishing the findings of the overall sample and those of various sub-samples. Section 4 examines the effects of investment opportunities and financing sources on the market reaction to investment announcements. In Section 5, we examine the crosssectional variation of the market reaction to investment announcements through a regression model. Conclusions and some final results follow in Section 6.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

(i) Data and Sample Characteristics
The corporate investment data used in this study were taken from a database composed of the historical records of public announcements by firms quoted on the Spanish Stock Markets. This database, compiled by the Spanish Securities Stock Commission (CNMV), collects all the files remitted by listed firms to the CNMV in fulfilment of their duty to report any relevant firm-related event which could significantly affect market prices. Corporations are required to send their files to the CNMV to prevent any asymmetry in the distribution of information. The CNMV attempts to enforce these practices by requiring the firm to immediately report all the available information on an event (or refute it) in those cases where the information has reached the market before its official disclosure by the CNMV (either as a rumour or through the financial press). If a rumour has begun to circulate, a note of this effect is included in the CNMV file, indicating that the information might already be impounded in prices. Other data contained in these files refer to the type of project undertaken (i.e., investment or divestment), the firms involved in the project, the expected starting date, and, occasionally, the magnitude 7 of the investment, its motivation and the financing sources employed.
To construct our sample, we selected those announcements relating to any investment or divestment project to be undertaken by the firm in the near future. The investment should involve either the acquisition or disposal of tangible and intangible fixed assets by the firm.
8 Investments in financial assets were excluded, and only considered when triggering a change in the level of tangible fixed assets. Investments involved in joint ventures among some firms were included; however, we excluded mergers and takeovers from the sample, due to the documented specific market reaction to this kind of event. A particular feature of our sample is that most divestments were undertaken by firms in an attempt to abandon non-strategic activities or lines of business, 9 so as to maximise the value of the remaining investment projects. In some other cases, the funds obtained from the divestments were designated to reduce the financial debt of the firm.
The period of study was January 1991 to June 1997, and the firms selected were all companies quoted on the Madrid Stock Exchange (MSE) or on the Spanish Continuous Market (SIBE). The number of announcements initially collected was 212. Nevertheless, the final sample was reduced to 114 corporate investment disclosures, of which 73 related to investments and 41 to divestments. We first screened those announcements that 720 DEL BRIO, PEROTE AND PINDADO could have been leaked to the market, namely those committed to by the firm at the request of the CNMV. Apart from this obvious screen, certain filters were applied for different methodological reasons, such as limitations on data availability or the need for isolating the event of interest. For this purpose, we separated out those confounding events which, qualitatively, seemed to be associated with major price movements in our sample: mergers and takeovers, exclusions from negotiation, equity issues and dividend payoffs on days (À3, þ3) were omitted. We also eliminated investment announcements occurring on twenty-one consecutive days to avoid overlapping events in the event period.
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Finally, a number of other databases were also employed in our research. Records of daily stock prices for both the SIBE and the MSE were obtained from the Daily Bulletin of the MSE; some other data were also required to construct explanatory variables, such as the firms' free cash flow or their q-ratios. The Interim Financial Reports for all quoted Spanish firms, published by the CNMV, the Monthly Statistics Bulletin published by the Spanish Statistics Institute, or the Economic Bulletin published by the Spanish Central Bank were some of the data sources employed for this purpose. More details about the data employed are available in Sections 4 and 5.
(ii) Methodology
The market response to investment announcements was measured using an event study methodology. To measure current returns, we used the difference of logarithms of closing prices for two consecutive days, as in equation (1).
where R it is the return for firm i at period t; P it are closing prices of shares of firm i at period t; d it is the dividend payout per one share of firm i at period t; and ds it stands for the subscription rights paid by firm i at period t.
Regarding abnormal returns, they are defined as the difference between current returns and the expected returns, which may be calculated by using different expected return models, as shown below.
(a) Return-generating Models To determine whether the market reacts to any announcement associated with investment decisions we tested the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns on the announcement day. We employed three alternative benchmark return-generating models in an attempt to improve the robustness of the results and to gauge the sensitivity of measured excess returns to changes in the return generation model. The three models employed were the traditional market model (hereafter MM), the MM corrected for non-synchronous trading by the Scholes and Williams estimator (we refer to it as SW_MM), and a MM adjusted to heteroskedasticity by a GARCH (1,1) model (referred to as GARCH_MM).
Therefore, the mean excess return for each security was estimated over the 120 days prior to day À10. These estimations were used later for prediction purposes within the event period (À10, þ10). The post-event period (from days þ1 to þ10) is intended to control for any market reaction which could take place gradually because of the investment. We also selected a pre-event period (À10, À1), in case any information leakages had taken place prior to the investment news. Day 0, or the announcement day, was the date when the CNMV disclosed the file containing information remitted by the firm.
The market model, for each asset i, may be written as in equation (2).
where R it and R mt stand for asset and market return, 11 respectively; u it represents a random variable distributed as independent N(0, 2 i ), and i and i are the parameters of the model. Regarding hypothesis testing, the traditional portfolio test was employed.
The second model tries to mitigate any effect due to thin trading as a way of preventing any loss of consistency in the parameter estimation, 12 whilst the third model is a modification of the MM which accounts for the heteroskedasticity of residuals; such an approach was recommended by Leon and Mora (1999) for the Spanish market. This model eliminates some of the MM's deficiencies when describing the stochastic behaviour of asset returns.
The incorporation of the conditional heteroskedasticity phenomenon requires the transformation of the market model by allowing the variance of the innovation to vary over time. Therefore, some structure for conditional volatility must be assumed, being the GARCH (1,1) model the most widely used to capture conditional heteroskedasticity. 13 We also employed this structure, which assumes that the innovation u it in equation (2) is conditionally distributed as N(0, 2 it ), where 2 it follows a GARCH process, as stated in equation (3):
Therefore, for testing purposes, the portfolio test was also modified accordingly to this GARCH structure by incorporating the estimated conditional variances for each period.
RESULTS
(i) Market Reaction to Investment Announcements: Results for the Overall Sample Table 1 displays the average abnormal returns and their associated test statistics for each day in the event period (À10, þ10), from the GARCH_MM model.
14 All the models produced similar results, leading to the same conclusion. None of the statistics detected abnormal returns from day 0 onwards. Nevertheless, a positive abnormal performance was found on day À5 at the 1% level of significance for the three statistics employed: the t-statistics for the MM (t_ MM ), the SW_MM (t_ SW ) and the GARCH_MM (t_ GARCH ). The analysis of the cumulative daily average returns (CARs) sheds new light on this topic. Average abnormal returns are aggregated over time so as to draw inferences on the impact of the events across firms and over time.
The time intervals selected are CAR (À10,À1) , CAR (þ1, þ10) and CAR (À10, þ10) , which represent the cumulative average returns for the pre-event, post-event, and the whole event period, respectively. We also calculated CARs around the event date CAR (À1,þ1) , and some shorter intervals which may help us to better capture the market reaction. The analysis of the CARs in Table 2 (first column) reveals that no market response exists during or after the event. The statistics also highlight the presence of abnormal performance in the pre-event period at the 5% level.
Therefore, the null hypothesis of abnormal returns being zero on day 0 is not rejected for any of the statistics employed and none of the CAR provides evidence of a market reaction on the days immediately following the event. The findings provide strong evidence that investment announcements do not convey new information to the market once they are released to the public. In turn, the excess returns detected in the pre-event period indicate that somehow the information has already leaked into prices before the disclosure of the announcement. Many studies have shown that a large proportion of abnormal stock market reaction is detected prior to the actual announcement owing to trading by insiders: around announcements of dividends (Aharony and Swary, 1980) , investments (John and Mishra, 1990) , new issues (Karpoff and Lee, 1991) , takeovers (Eyssell and Arshadi, 1993) or corporate financing decisions (Giammarino et al., 1994) . Webb (1999) supports the hypothesis of managers timing exchange listings, in the same way that Penman (1982) shows how corporate insiders time the trades in their firms' stock in relation to the date of the disclosure of their annual earnings forecasts. Similarly, Spanish insiders seem to be timing their trades around their investment announcements. 
Notes:
CARs drawn by the GARCH_MM are provided, together with the t_GARCH statistics, shown in parentheses. The first column shows the results for the overall sample; the last two columns display the results for the ICE and DCE subsamples. N stands for the number of observations in each subsample. * Significant at the 5% level.
IMPACT OF INVESTMENT ANNOUNCEMENTS ON SHARE PRICES
But other possible explanations could also be advanced to explain this particular pattern in abnormal returns. The announcement content may have already been disclosed through a different channel, i.e., the financial press, or our models may have failed to detect the news. The former explanation is partly invalidated by the fact that it contradicts the spirit of the CNMV rules, conceived so as to prevent the information from being released before its official publication in the files of the CNMV. A final possible explanation is that the event does not convey any news, an explanation also considered by Bhattacharya et al. (2000) 15 and by Huberman and Schwert (1985) . The cross-sectional analysis described in Section 5 sheds more light on this aspect of the topic.
There are a number of differences in the statistics computed by the various models employed, reinforcing the need to account for non-synchronous trading and conditional heteroskedasticity. It is worth stating that when the latter problem arises (and this was the case with our data) and all the parameters are jointly estimated, results may affect not only the estimated variance, but also the values of conditional mean parameters and thus the prediction of normal returns. In that sense, it should be pointed out although the same final conclusions are derived from individual statistics, the presence of abnormal returns within an interval is more easily detected when conditional heteroskedasticity is considered. For this reason, in the following sections only the CARs and the t-statistics drawn by the GARCH_MM are provided.
(ii) Sub-samples Previous results show the need for further analysis in order to explain the market reaction to corporate investment news. We therefore disaggregated the overall sample according to the type of announcement, i.e., increases in capital expenditures (ICE) versus decreases in capital expenditures (DCE). The rationale for examining the possible differences in the market response to these announcements regarding investment type comes from the available evidence which suggests that increases (decreases) in capital expenditures are followed by positive (negative) abnormal performances (McConnell and Muscarella, 1985) . Nevertheless, other examples of positive abnormal performance following divestment announcements can be found in the literature.
The results obtained for the full sample are mirrored within these subgroups, no market reaction is detected on day 0 when the sample is divided into investment and divestment announcements. Instead, a positive reaction takes place around day À5 for both sub-samples, as indicated by the CARs for the intervals (À10, À1) and (À5, 0) shown in the second and third columns of Table 2 . This pre-event reaction is clearly significant in the interval (À5, 0) for the ICE sample, and in the interval (À10, À1) for the DCE sample.
In this sense, three major findings should be highlighted. First, DCE announcements provoke a positive rather than a negative market reaction, in accordance with Afshar et al. (1992) , Denning and Shatri (1990) and Corhay and Tourani Rad (1996) . As some of these papers suggest, a number of specific features of our sample may be determining the sign and magnitude of this market response. Most of the divestments in our sample were undertaken by firms that wanted to eliminate non-strategic lines of business and only three of the announced DCEs were reported by financially distressed firms. Therefore, our results tend to support Easterwood's (1998) prediction that non-distressed firms exhibit a greater abnormal performance 16 when they report asset sales. When a divestment on real assets is not due to financial distress problems, investors may be willing to pay a bigger premium for news that the firm is abandoning non-profitable activities and that there will be a subsequent cash inflow to the firm. Actually, some of the inflows derived from the announced DCE were used to reduce the firm's financial debt. Kalra et al. (1994) also document a positive reaction to some DCE announcements, depending on the motivation for the divestment. Under these circumstances, the motivation to divest may also be determining the positive reaction to DCE. Second, this increase in a firm's wealth is also evidenced by the CARs realised for the entire event period (À10, þ10), which are only significant for the DCE sample (at the 10% level). Third, the positive CARs for the pre-event period, once more, provide evidence on intensive informed trading taking place before the disclosure of both investment and divestment announcements.
THE EXPECTED IMPACT OF INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND THE LEVEL OF FREE CASH FLOW ON THE MARKET REACTION TO INVESTMENT ANNOUNCEMENTS
Earlier studies have reported how the non-availability of valuable investment opportunities influences the market reaction surrounding investment announcements. Following these studies, we also tested whether the impact of capital spending announcements on share prices is affected by the value of available investment opportunities. Therefore, we disaggregated the sample into two sub-samples depending on the value of Tobin's q, which has traditionally been employed to approximate investment opportunities (Lang et al., 1989 and Pillote, 1992; and Chung et al., 1998 ). Tobin's q ratio is measured using equation (4):
where MVE it and MVD it are the market value of equity and the market value of debt, respectively; and K it is the replacement value of capital. All the values have been calculated as in Miguel and Pindado (2001) . Therefore, for q ratio values greater than one, investment opportunities are classified as valuable. Share prices are thus expected to move upwards when news of capital spending is published and the firm's investment opportunities are of high quality. We classify such a firm as a valuable-project firm (hereafter, VP). For q ratios smaller than unity, the reaction to the announcement is expected to be downwards and hence abnormal returns are expected to be negative. Firms with Tobin's q less than one are classified as non-valuable-project firms (NVP).
In order to test the free cash flow theory, the sample is disaggregated into a sample of low-free-cash-flow firms (hereafter, LFCF) and high-free-cash-flow firms (HFCF), according to whether or not a firm has cash flow which is not exhausted by investment opportunities. For this purpose, we follow Chen and Ho's (1997) procedure. They define a low-cash-flow firm as a firm whose free cash flow is less than the sample median.
17 As a measure for free cash flow, following Miguel and Pindado (2001) , we considered a variable defined as the interaction between cash flow and the inverse of investment opportunities. According to the free cash flow theory, we expected a negative relationship between a firm's level of free cash flow and the expected return from the investment announcement.
The subsamples thus obtained are subsequently made to interact with the type of announcements, giving rise to eight subsamples: (i) HFCF firms announcing investments, (ii) HFCF firms announcing divestments, (iii) LFCF firms announcing investments, (iv) HFCF firms announcing divestments, (v) VP firms announcing investments, (vi) VP firms announcing divestments, (vii) NVP firms announcing investments, and finally (viii) NVP firms announcing divestments. Table 3 shows the different results obtained for each of the eight subsamples at different time intervals, mainly the preevent, post-event and event period, as well as some other shorter intervals, in order to capture better the date of the impact. Regarding the interaction between the type of investment and the level of free cash flow, once more, no market reaction is detected on the announcement date; however, the results for the post-event period differ from those obtained for the full sample (shown in Table 2 ). In fact, LFCF firms announcing ICEs experience positive abnormal returns five days after the announcements, at the 5% confidence level. In turn, ICE announcements by HFCF firms are penalised by the market with a downward reaction, as shown by the values for CARs in the interval (þ4, þ5). Under the free cash flow theory, this postevent market reaction is explained as a consequence of the investors' belief that only the investment projects undertaken by the LFCF firms are valuable. In this sense, our results tend to support the free cash flow theory. Nevertheless, positive abnormal returns are detected within the pre-event period -interval (À6, À4) -for both LFCF and HFCF firms which announce ICEs and especially for HFCF firms announcing DCE. The fact that the only positive market reaction to announcements by HFCF firms takes place before the event date could also be explained from an asymmetric information perspective. If we consider the possibility of insiders trading before the Table 3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Different Subsamples 
Notes:
For the different subÀsamples, the CARs drawn by the GARCH_MM are provided, together with the t_GARCH statistics, shown in parentheses.
However, for the groups including NVP firms, a Corrado (1989) test was employed to avoid any bias due to the small sample size.
N is the number of observations in each sample. * Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level.
announcement, managers are more likely to be investing in the group of HFCF firms than uninformed investors. Recall that they can access private information regarding the quality of the investment project; thus, when HFCF firms undertake valuable projects, insiders would be more likely to know their quality and, therefore, to trade before the announcement date. However, uninformed investors -for whom the quality of the project is only signalled through the level of free cash flow of the firmwould not invest. For the whole event period (À10, þ10), the market reacts to the announcement of DCEs by LFCF firms, probably rewarding the abandonment of non-strategic assets as a way of increasing the level of funds so as to finance more valuable investments. This idea is also reinforced by the fact that the market also reacts positively to the divestments announced by firms whose q-ratio is higher than unity, as shown below.
Our empirical findings regarding the effects of the quality of investment opportunities in interaction with the type of investment are shown in Column II of Table 3 . 18 The main conclusion that may be drawn for the sample of VP firms is that in the post-event period, Spanish markets seem to positively react to increases in capital spending announced by VP firms. In fact, a positive abnormal performance is observed for the subsample of ICE-VP firms at the 1% level. Regarding the announcement of divestments by these VP firms, the main reaction takes place before the announcement, supporting the presence of inside traders. Uninformed investors also react positively, although more timidly, as signalled by the abnormal returns captured during the entire holding period at the 10% confidence level.
For the group of NVP firms, the results show the absence of any significant reaction either before or after any ICE or DCE announcements. This pattern contradicts previous empirical findings since Spanish investors do not seem to penalise those firms whose q-ratios suggest that there are no valuable investment opportunities present; that is, investor expectations do not seem to be affected by the small q-ratio of the firm.
Overall, we may say that during the post-event period, Spanish investors react positively to VP firms which announce ICE and whose level of FCF is low. For the pre-event period, however, the market reaction is almost the same regardless of the level of FCF and the type of announcement, which seems to corroborate the possibility of insiders trading before corporate announcements. These results, however, can be influenced by the effects of the interaction between other factors affecting the market response to corporate announcements. For this reason, Section 5 analyses the cross-sectional response of the stock price reaction to corporate investment.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Previous sections reported that the Spanish market seems to impound the information content of corporate investment announcements five days before their official disclosure. However, the reasons for such an early reaction have not yet been determined. For this purpose, we performed a cross-sectional analysis so as to explain the magnitude of the impact of the release of new information on the market. As a proxy for the market reaction, abnormal returns are commonly employed. In fact, the ARs for the event date, date 0, or the cumulative abnormal returns for longer event windows, i.e, (0, þ1), are traditionally used for this purpose. However, the market reaction to investment announcements in Spanish markets did not take place on day 0, but earlier in the pre-event period. Therefore, the first dependent variable that we considered was the cumulative abnormal returns for the pre-event period, CAR (À10, À1) . 19 However, although there was not a noticeable market reaction for the overall sample, the disaggregation of the sample in Section 4 produced evidence on the existence of a post-event market reaction. Furthermore, this post-event market reaction differed substantially from the pre-event reaction, hence both periods should be analysed separately. Under these circumstances, we selected a second dependent variable, represented by the cumulative daily abnormal returns during the post-event period, CAR (þ1, þ10) . Finally, we selected a third dependent variable, CAR (À10, þ10) , which allowed us to test whether any effect could be extended to the entire event period.
As explanatory variables of the model, in addition to the type of investment, the free cash flow and the investment opportunities of the firm -whose effects have already been documented in previous sections -we included some other factors that may also affect the magnitude and characteristics of the market reaction to corporate investment announcements. In this sense, a crucial factor in analysing the announcement effect of any corporate investment is its level of surprise, i.e. whether the market expects it or not. However, the absence of a model to discriminate between expected and unexpected investment has led to the generalised assumption that the expected investment level for a fiscal year is equal to the amount of spending which took place in previous years. 20 Based on this notion, we measured the unexpected portion of the announcement (hereafter UNEX) as the difference in the investment at the fiscal year-end prior to and after the announcement date, divided by the market value of a firm's equity, 21 as in equation (5):
where I it is the book value of investment at the end of fiscal year t (obtained from the Interim Financial Reports collected by the CNMV); and MVE it stands for the market value of equity. MVE it ¼ P it S it , where P it represents firm i's share prices (obtained from the Daily Bulletin of the MSE), and S it stands for the number of firm i shares outstanding (also obtained from the Interim Financial Reports collected by the CNMV). This variable was constructed as a combination of the measurements employed by Vogt (1997) and Zantout and Tsetsekos (1994) . A positive relationship between the amount of unexpected investment per unit of market capitalisation and the share price response was also expected.
Regarding the level of uncertainty over the announcement in the market, it is crucial to analyse the abnormal returns obtained prior to the disclosure of the announcement. Their magnitude and sign indicate whether any information leakage has taken place and therefore whether informed investors may be anticipating their trading. In previous sections it was confirmed that the Spanish market reacts positively to the announcement five days before its release. The abnormal returns obtained during the pre-event period are usually considered as prima facie evidence of the presence of asymmetric information. If so, this situation suggested the incorporation of a measurement of private information into our model.
Since no directly observable measurement of the level of private information on the market exists, the bid/ask spreadmeasured as the price at which the market maker is willing to buy (the bid) and sell (the ask) -has represented one of the most commonly used proxies for private information in the context of the asymmetric information paradigm and the market microstructure literature. It is based on the premise that, all things being equal, the wider the bid/ask spread the more likely it is that the market maker believes that an event has occurred and tries to be compensated for the risk of trading against an informed investor. If so, the presence of informed traders leads to increases in bid/ask spreads prior to the disclosure of the announcement, because the market maker anticipates losing to the insiders and tries to recoup this expected loss by widening the bid/ask spread and transferring the costs to the uninformed investors.
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From the many variables which are available to proxy for the bid/ask spread, we selected a simplified version of the spread defined by Blanco (1999) , as shown in equation (6). 23 Blanco proposes a measure similar to the percentage spread employed by Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) , but adjusted by bid/ask depths. This is due to the fact that when the probability of the existence of private information in the market increases, liquidity traders react by increasing the bid/ask spread and decreasing the number of titles available on each side of the market (that is, the bid/ask depth). As noted by Harris (1994) , a complete characterisation of market liquidity should encompass these two dimensions:
where T j stands for the time interval during which the order is open; T t is the sum of the T j of the N orders; P P j and P S j are, respectively, the average of the five best sale and purchase prices at each size of the market associated with an average size order. Finally, our model specification includes a variable constructed as the interaction between the free cash flow and the level of unexpected investment (FCF*UNEX), referred to as FI. According to Vogt (1997) , the positive relationship between the unexpected level of investment and the market reaction should be analysed in interaction with the free cash flow of the firm. In this sense, abnormal returns associated with an increase in the level of unexpected investment may decrease when the level of free cash flow of the firm is higher since managers are likely to employ these funds to finance investment projects with negative NPV (thereby supporting the free cash flow theory). Alternatively, the abnormal returns associated with an increase in the level of unexpected investment may increase when the level of free cash flow is higher since firms become less dependent on external funds for financing their investment projects, supporting the pecking order theory. Therefore, a negative (positive) relationship between stock prices and this interaction-variable suggests that investors react negatively (positively) to increases in unexpected spending when free cash flow increases, thus supporting the free cash flow (pecking order) theory.
Therefore, a linear specification was proposed relating the market reaction to the previously described explanatory variables: announcement type, free cash flow, investment opportunities, level of unexpected investment, the interaction effect between the unexpected investment and the free cash flow of a firm, and the bid/ask spread. Accordingly, we estimated a cross-sectional regression in the form of equation (7):
where CAR it stands for the cumulative abnormal returns attained by each firm on each of the time intervals previously selected, that is, CAR (À10,À1) stands for the CARs obtained during the preevent period; CAR (þ1,þ10) stands for those obtained during the post-event period, and finally CAR (À10,þ10) stands for those obtained for the whole event period. FCF and Q stand for free cash flow and investment opportunities, respectively; UNEX refers to the unexpected investment; FI is the interaction between the level of free cash flow of the firm and the level of unexpected investment; TYPE means the announcement type (a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm announces an ICE and zero otherwise); and finally, SPREAD means the bid/ ask spread and depth. Table 4 provides summary data on the variables examined in this study. Results are shown in Table 5 . For CAR (À10,À1) , the model specifies SPREAD as the main determinant of the positive excessive returns observed in the pre-event period, as derived from the high value of the t-statistic (4.16). The impact of informed investors on the market reaction is undeniable, and seems to be the force behind some noticeable features in the model specification; some variables, such as Q and TYPE, which are traditionally deemed relevant for forming investors' expectations, appear to be irrelevant for explaining the market reaction in the pre-event period. We should also notice the lack of significance of FCF and FI. The effects of the larger spread in this period could also be the reason for the negative correlation between CAR (À10,À1) and UNEX, showing that the level of market uncertainty diminishes as private information is impounded in prices.
When regressing cumulative abnormal returns for the postevent period (CAR (þ1, þ10) ) on the explanatory variables, the results are reported in the second column of Table 5 . The model supports the free cash flow theory, previously documented for Spanish markets in Section 4 of this paper, as indicated by the negative correlation found between abnormal returns and both FCF and FI. The explanation lies in the fact that investors seem to penalise increases in FCF when firms waste their free cash flow in value-destroying investments. Furthermore, CAR (þ1, þ10) are found to be a positive function of the level of investment opportunities at the 10% level, in accordance with previous results for Chen and Ho (1997) and Chung et al. (1998) .
Finally, the model also provides relevant evidence when explaining CAR (À10, þ10) . It also specifies a negative relationship between CAR (À10, þ10) and FI, thus corroborating the results in favour of the FCF theory for the whole event period in Section 4. The main explanatory variable of the market reaction during the whole event period is UNEX, indicating that the more unexpected the news, the bigger the market reaction, as shown by its À2.62Eþ00
6.69EÀ01
Note:
Data refer to a sample of 84 firms which disclosed corporate investment announcements in Spanish markets during 1992-1997.
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positive relation with CAR (À10, þ10) . Regarding the direction of the change in capital investment, the variable TYPE is negatively related to CAR (À10, þ10) . This result is consistent with the CARs obtained for the DCE sample for this period. The motivation of divestments appears as the determinant of this larger reaction to DCE announcements, since the level of uncertainty attributable to the success of a decision to sell non-strategic assets is inferior to that caused by new investment projects undertaken by the firm. Finally, we should state that the variable SPREAD did not help to explain either CAR (þ1, þ10) or CAR (À10, þ10) , indeed both estimations improve when it is dropped from the model (as has been done in Table 5 ), which contrasted with its high significance in the explanation of the pre-event market reaction. Nevertheless, investigation into the market reaction to investment announcements should go further. Since the post-event market reaction was mainly detected for the disaggregated sample, we obtained additional evidence by regressing CAR (þ1, þ10) on the previous explanatory variables after controlling for structural change caused by the type of announcement, the quality of investment opportunities and their interaction with the level of free cash flow of the firm. Therefore, apart from the dummy variable TYPE, we constructed two other dummy variables, DF and DQ, which allowed us to capture the different behaviour within each of the eight subsamples distinguished in Section 4. The resulting model, Model 2, is shown in equation (8):
where TFQ it is constructed as the interaction term TYPE it *DF it *DQ it , DF it is a dummy variable which takes a value of one for HFCF firms and zero, otherwise; and DQ it is a dummy variable which takes a value of one for VP firms and zero, otherwise. The rest of the variables are defined as in equation (7), and u i represents the error term. It should be noted that DF i has only been included in the model within the interaction variable, since its inclusion will lead to perfect collinearity, a case well-known as the dummy variable tramp. An analysis of the variance for this new model was then performed to test possible structural changes in the model (according to the different subsamples considered throughout this study), as well as the interactions among the dummy variables. Results of the analysis of variance are shown in Table 6 . The analysis reveals some features that should be highlighted.
First of all, it is clear that the significance of Model 2 is higher than that of Model 1, as denoted by the higher value of the F-statistic (3.84 and 2.70, respectively), which reinforces the need not to restrict the study to the overall sample, but rather to distinguish the specific reaction to each group of announcements: ICE versus DCE, LFCF announcing firms versus HFCF announcing firms, and so on.
In this sense, the significance of some variables increases noticeably when the sample is disaggretated. This is the case of variable Q, which was only significant at the 10% level in Model 1, and whose F-statistic is 7.72, supporting the existence of a different pattern for VP and NVP firms. Moreover, the sign of the coefficient indicates a positive relationship between market reaction and level of investment opportunities. The variable TYPE, which was not significant for explaining the post-event behaviour of the full sample, also becomes more significant when the sample is disaggregated and when interacting with both Q and FCF, as denoted by the high F-value for both TYPE and TFQ. In this sense, the sign of the coefficient for TYPE indicates a negative relationship between market reaction and type of investment, which corroborates the bigger information content detected in previous sections for DCEs during the whole event period. Model 2 is able to capture this relationship for the post-event period as well. The positive coefficient for TFQ brings to light the positive relationship between this interaction variable and the market reaction. Therefore, when TFQ takes the value of one, i.e., the firm announces an ICE, its level of free cash flow is high and its investment opportunities are valuable, the investors interpret the announcement as good news. Hence, the analysis of the variable TFQ offers new evidence with respect to the market reaction to investment announcements; in particular, it shows that investors are prepared to reward HFCF firms announcing ICE only when Vogt (1994) and Born and Ryan's (2000) findings for the oil-and-gas industry, and reflects the need to restrict managers' investment decisions to positive NPV projects and reduce information asymmetries within the firm.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
The rationale of this study consists basically in constructing a proper scenario to measure the market response to investment announcements in the Spanish market. We have considered a sample which incorporates both tangible and intangible fixed assets, and we have constructed three different measures of abnormal returns to ensure that we have accurately captured the true market reaction. We have also considered the effect of several variables that, in accordance with previous financial literature, may influence the impact of investment announcements. Moreover, we have provided new evidence, since the Spanish market behaviour seems to differ from that of other markets. This study is a valuable contribution to the knowledge of European financial market reactions to investment announcements, since no conclusive results have been found in the literature so far.
The Spanish market embodies the effects of any investment announcement five days before the announcement and no reaction is expected from day 0 onwards for the overall sample, although the post-event market reaction comes to light when disaggregating the sample according to different criteria. Indeed, both the free cash flow and the level of investment opportunities are deemed relevant for forming investors' expectations. In particular, the free cash flow theory of Jensen is supported, whilst investors are only prepared to reward firms with high free cash flow when they announce increases in capital expenditure and their investment opportunities are profitable. This study also reveals the larger information content of divestment versus investment announcements, and points out the existence of information asymmetries which determine the pre-event market reaction to investment announcements. 10 We thus lose 98 events, out of which 14 were announcements which could have already been leaked to the market; 40 events were lost owing to the lack of available data and 31 owing to the existence of confounding events (12 events concurrent with dividend payoffs, 3 with mergers, 2 with exclusions of negotiation and 14 with equity issues). Finally, 13 events were eliminated so as to avoid overlapping events. 11 As a proxy variable for the market return, the I.G.B.M. (General Index of the Madrid Stock Exchange) was used. 12 Recall that the use of daily return data introduces the problem of errors in variables owing to the deviations of measured returns to the true returns. Although the average quoting rate of the shares in our sample is not too bad, around 65%, the use of some adjustment to non-synchronous trading is recommended so as to reduce the impact of thin trading. 13 Note that the unconditional density is not normal since it has thicker tails than the standard normal (Bollerslev, 1986 ). 14 Similar results were obtained with the other two models. Tables will be provided by the authors upon request. 15 The title of this paper is quite explicit: when an event is not an event.
However, they analyse the Mexican Stock Market, as an example of an emerging market 16 It is noteworthy that Easterwood (1998) uses the abnormal bond returns as proxy for abnormal performance. 17 The disaggregation of the sample into HFCF and LFCF firms was also made by considering the difference between the FCF of the firm and the average FCF of its industry. However, the results vary little within both procedures. 18 Due to the small size of the sample of NVP firms, we employed the nonparametric test of Corrado (1989) for hypothesis testing. 19 Nevertheless, we also estimated the market reaction on day 0, using as dependent variable the abnormal returns obtained on that day. It specifies the level of surprise of the news as the only explanatory variable, meaning that new unexpected information has indeed arrived at the market on this date, and the bigger the amount of the unexpected investment, the larger the market reaction. 20 As stated by McConnell and Muscarella (1985) and others, the absence of a model to measure expected investment is a caveat of the investment literature. The attempts of authors such as Vogt (1997) or Ryan (2000) to determine the level of prior certainty about a firm's future investment projects by analysing the level of investment undertaken by the firm in the past represents a first step towards its modelisation. However, the use of short time series may distort these attempts. 21 Similar measurements are found in Zantout and Tsetsekos (1994) , Vogt (1997) and Born and Ryan (2000) . McConnell and Muscarella (1985) also address this issue but from a different perspective. 22 Copeland and Galai (1983) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Glosten and Harris (1988) were some of the pioneers in analysing the informational component of the bid/ask spread. More recently, Jang and Lee (1995) , Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) and Easley et al. (1998) have advanced their work in this area. In the Spanish market, Rubio and Tapia (1996) , Blanco (1999) and Del Brio (1999) have also analysed the bid/ask spread as an informational phenomenon.
23 The basis of this measurement lies in the consideration of the time interval during which the order remains open and the consideration of a unique and fixed volume of titles for each firm and session (average size order). This order replaces the NTITA order artificially constructed by Blanco to guarantee that the orders are representative of the market status at least 80% of the time. Records of sale and purchase prices and depths were obtained from the Stock Exchange Dealers Association.
